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We analyze the 2019 Chilean social unrest episode, consisting of a sequence of events, through the lens of an epidemic-
like model that considers global contagious dynamics. We adjust the parameters to the Chilean social unrest aggregated
public data available from the Undersecretary of Human Rights, and observe that the number of violent events follows a
well-defined pattern already observed in various public disorder episodes in other countries since the sixties. Although
the epidemic-like models display a single event that reaches a peak followed by an exponential decay, we add standard
perturbation schemes that may produce a rich temporal behavior as observed in the 2019 Chilean social turmoil. Al-
though we only have access to aggregated data, we are still able to fit it to our model quite well, providing interesting
insights on social unrest dynamics.
The social unrest that has been simmering in Chile for a
number of years ended up in October 2019 with a massive
turmoil in the capital city Santiago that quickly turned
violent and started spreading into other cities within the
country, provoking costly damage to public and private
infrastructure, and causing serious injuries to a group of
the population. Epidemic-like models can be applied to
understand the dynamics of complex social phenomena
such as social unrest episodes in which contagion effects
could take place. Therefore, being able to describe the
mechanism and predict the temporal evolution of a poten-
tially violent crowd can provide useful insights to author-
ities involved in politics and security who want to make
informed decisions with a view to controlling and mitigat-
ing these episodes of social unrest. As extant literature has
already noticed for other countries, the Chilean social un-
rest episodes depict a standard dynamic in which a single
riot event reaches a peak that is then followed by an expo-
nential decay. However, the addition of an external forcing
changes dramatically this simple picture in a complex sce-
nario characterized by a sequence of events, like the ones
observed in the Chilean social unrest episode.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social unrest due to economic, political and/or social fac-
tors was all over the world news in 2019. A recent report
on global political risk1 shows that a quarter of all the world’s
countries saw a significant upsurge in civil unrest during 2019,
including locations as diverse as Chile, Haiti, Hong Kong,
Lebanon, Nigeria, Sudan and Venezuela. Furthermore, prior
to the Covid-19 pandemia, forecasts showed that this worry-
ing trend would be likely to continue in 2020.
a)Author to whom correspondence should be addressed: joce-
lyn.olivari@uai.cl
The problem of public disorder, riots and civil unrest has
been studied for more than forty years2–7. The causes behind
each episode are complex and diverse, given the unique in-
stitutional framework that prevails in each country. Still, all
of them somehow end up disrupting the daily lives of the citi-
zenship and, if mishandled, can sometimes cascade into large-
scale violent manifestations of criminality8. Depending on
the depth of the social turmoil, it can cause substantial dam-
age to transport systems and to private and public property,
while also disrupting supply chains, which negatively impacts
economic activity and growth. Furthermore, they can also be-
come violent, thus evolving into a public security problem that
can provoke serious injuries and death. Even more extremely,
if it scales into a nation wide phenomena, it can pave the way
for political instability or even a government overthrow, like
in Tunisia and Egypt at the aftermath of the Arab Spring in
2011.
Recently, in October 2019 the world saw the poster child of
Latin America, Chile, go through massive demonstrations in
the capital city of Santiago, triggered by rising subway fares.
Within a few days, protesters turned violent and the social tur-
moil rapidly spread to other regions of the country, forcing lo-
cal authorities to declare a state of emergency and impose mil-
itary curfews in several cities. The first month of unrest alone
caused an estimated USD$4.6 billion worth of infrastructure
damage, and cost the Chilean economy around USD$3 billion,
or 1.1% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)1.
Being able to describe and predict the temporal evolution
of a potentially violent crowd can provide useful insights
to authorities involved in politics and security who want to
make informed decisions in terms of controlling and miti-
gating these episodes of social unrest. It is in this context
that mathematical modelling and numerical simulations offer
a great advantage over empirical observation, as they have the
potential to describe the mechanics and the factors affecting
the dynamics of the social event, and hence provide profound
understanding of the social phenomena under study. In partic-
ular, such modelling allows distinct scenarios to be explored,
as well as the possibility to test different control or mitigation
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strategies at low cost, and without the ethical concerns of field
experiments. Although the control of riots is only one aspect
of the problem - disorder has complex long-term sociological
causes which also mandate attention - the near-inevitability of
periodic social tensions means that mitigation must be consid-
ered as part of any strategy.
Epidemic-like models can be applied to social phenom-
ena such as social unrest episodes in which contagion effects
could take place. Burbeck, Raine and Abudu Stark introduced
this approach in the seventies to analyze large-scale urban ri-
ots in Los Angeles, Detroit and Washington D.C. (See Ref. 3).
Inspired by clinical sciences, one initial case of a contagious
disease in a large-scale population can easily spread into an
epidemic if the infectious individual comes into contact with
a sufficiently large number of susceptible individuals, where
each contact - between a susceptible individual with an infec-
tious one - is accompanied by some chance that the suscep-
tible person will contract the infection. In less dense groups,
the infected person comes into contact with fewer susceptibles
and the chances that he/she will cease to be infectious before
successfully infecting someone else are greater3. In fact, the
authors find that behavioral epidemics can explain the conta-
gion process of riots that occurred during the sixties in United
States, which requires susceptibility of individuals to get in-
volved into rioting as well as contact with the riot; among
other things, they observe that that propagation of social un-
rest does not require the spatial displacement of individual ri-
oters.
More recently, Bonnasse-Gahot et al.7 applied similar ideas
to the 2005 French riots, which started in a poor suburb in
Paris and within three weeks had spread all over France. In
line with Burbeck et al., they found that although there was
little displacement of rioters, the riot activity did travel. On
the other hand, Davies et al.9,10 claim, using a hybrid of epi-
demiological and transport models, that spatial displacement
of individuals is at the basis of the London 2011 episodes of
large-scale disorder. The results suggest that the distribution
of rioting can be understood in terms of the spatial configu-
ration of London, with highly transited areas at greater risk
than others; this coincides with empirical research that shows,
for example, that the proximity of a particular location to un-
derground train stations, or other public transport nodes, in-
creases its probability of being looted6.
In this paper we aim to answer the following research
question: Can we model the temporal evolution of the 2019
Chilean riot using epidemiological models? To answer this
question we compare the available aggregated data recorded
by the Undersecretary for Human Rights of the Chilean Min-
istry of Justice and Human Rights with the solution of such
models. We also compare the main traits of Chilean rioting
episodes with other similar events around the world. An inter-
esting feature of the Chilean social unrest episode, regarding
its dynamics, is the existence of a number of sizeable rebounds
showing particularly rich dynamics not observed in the usual
epidemic-like model, meaning that a reformulation is needed
to fully describe the evolution of events observed in Chile.
The current paper is organized as follows. Section II pro-
vides some background information on the Chilean economic
and social context, and on the social unrest episodes that
started in 2019; the empirical behavior of these events is also
discussed. Next, Section III presents an epidemic-like model
that considers global variables such as the number of rioting
events, rioters, and the susceptible population to join a riot.
Some extensions that could improve the explanatory power
of the model are presented, such as the addition of an exter-
nal forcing that can influence the susceptibility of the popula-
tion to join a rioting episode, which can end up predicting the
existence of a temporal behavior that may follow a periodic,
quasi-periodic, or chaotic dynamics. In Section IV, the results
of the data analysis are presented. Finally, in Section V we
provide some final remarks, discuss implications, and outline
new perspectives regarding social unrest episodes; a worrying
trend that is likely to continue in the upcoming years.
II. THE 2019 CHILEAN SOCIAL UNREST
A. Economic and Social Context
The Chilean economy has been usually praised as a suc-
cessful case since neoliberal reforms were implemented dur-
ing the dictatorship period, which lasted from 1973 until early
1990. Since democracy was restored in 1990, the seven ensu-
ing governments continued with the market economic model,
although with different “flavors” as a result of social and eco-
nomic reforms, and specific policy approaches implemented
by each of them in response to the national and interna-
tional context11. The Chilean economy went through various
phases, some of which were quite remarkable in terms of eco-
nomic growth and improvement of social indicators: during
the period 1990-98, for example, annual GDP growth rates
averaged 7.1%11 and the Gini coefficient dropped from 57.2
to 55.5, according to estimates of The World Bank (a Gini in-
dex of 0 represents perfect income equality, while an index
of 100 implies perfect inequality)12. Some other phases were
marked by the country’s vulnerability to external turbulences,
such as the Asian crisis in 1998 and the global crisis in late
2008 and 2009. Overall, since 1990 the country’s economic
performance facilitated the improvement of several social in-
dicators in the upcoming decades, such as the percentage of
the population living in poverty (on US$ 5.5 per day) which
dropped from 46.1% in 1990 to 6.4% in 2017, while life ex-
pectancy at birth rose from 73.5 years old to almost 80 during
the same period12.
Sound macroeconomic policies and fiscal responsibility
eventually allowed Chile to become in 2010 the first South
American country to be a member of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an exclu-
sive club of thirty seven countries that together account for al-
most two thirds of the world’s GDP. For years Chile has been
the poster child of Latin America and has often been consid-
ered an example of economic success. After all, steady growth
allowed per capita GDP to grow almost sixfold according to
The World Bank, from US$4.5k in 1990 to US$25.2k in 2018,
exceeding the US$16.6k average per capita income of Latin
American and Caribbean countries (per capita GDP is mea-
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sured in purchase power parity and constant 2011 USD)12.
As previously mentioned, indicators that measure income
inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, seem to have been
improving in the last decades, which according to the World
Bank was reduced from 57.2 in 1990 to 44.4 in 2017 (See
Ref. 12). However, this improvement is mild in relative
terms, since Chile remains one of the most unequal coun-
tries among OECD economies13. And although over the past
three decades, the gap between the rich and poor has widened
in the large majority of OECD countries, the average esti-
mated Gini, excluding Chile, is a much lower 31.1 (See Ref.
14). Furthermore, according to ECLAC, the richest 1% of
the Chilean population concentrated almost 27% of the net
wealth of the country in 201715. These factors may contribute
to the widespread feeling of social discontentment and unfair-
ness that simmered in many Chileans in the years leading up to
October 2019. In fact, for the past few years Chile has seen an
upswing of diverse social movements; the Student Movement,
the Mapuche Movement, the Labor Movement, the Femi-
nist Movement, and the Environmental Movement are among
the widespread demonstrations that have influenced the po-
litical arena16.17 For example, in 2006 and 2011 the Student
Movement led thousands of students into the streets to de-
mand better public education, more social justice and equal
opportunities18. It is perhaps, therefore, unsurprising that a
share of the Chilean population, especially the rising middle
class, claims that after years of unfulfilled promises regard-
ing economic prosperity for all, eventually “Chile woke up”,
culminating in the massive protests in October 2019.
In Fig.1 we summarize the key events that occurred be-
tween October and November 2019 (see more detail in Ap-
pendix A). The protests, led by high school and college stu-
dents, started on October 7th in the capital city of Santiago
due an increase in the subway fare that provoked public out-
cry. After two weeks, protests quickly turned massive and
violent, and the turmoil started spreading into other cities
within the country. On October 18th, students in Santiago
massively evaded the subway fee in defiance over the fare in-
crease. As police attempted to stop students disturbing sub-
way stations, protesters spilled out into the street, burning and
destroying metro stations and looting supermarkets, pharma-
cies, and shops. Since rioters could not be controlled by the
local police, the President, Sebastián Piñera, decided to de-
clare a state of emergency to safeguard public order. Military
forces were deployed to the streets in many cities and cur-
fews were enforced. After days of both violent and peaceful
demonstrations, it was understood that the cause behind the
protests was beyond the increase in the subway fare, and it in-
cluded demands for a substantial improvement in living stan-
dards, pensions, health care and education, among other con-
cerns. Furthermore, protesters wanted these improvements
right away. After these violent episodes, and a massive peace-
ful demonstration on October 25th that gathered more than a
million people19 in different locations in Santiago and the rest
of the country, the President eventually yielded to the press-
ing demands of the population. Since then, some reforms
have been announced, including an agreement to scheduled
a referendum for April 26th 2020 to vote for a change in the
Chilean Constitution written in 1980. However, due to the
Covid-19 pandemic, the referendum has been postponed to
October 2020. This external shock seems also to have paused
massive protests due to mandatory and voluntary lockdowns.
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FIG. 1. Timeline of the 2019 Chilean social crisis. The warm-up
phase took place between October 7th and October 18th 2019, when
the massive and violent social unrest was triggered. (Data from Ref.
20).
B. Social crisis and catastrophe theory
The disorder observed in Chile in 2019 displayed many fea-
tures in common with previous episodes of a similar nature.
In particular, one general signature is the existence of differ-
ent phases as the disorder evolves: a slow process of warming
up over an extended period, followed by an abrupt outbreak in
which the system rapidly transitions to a peak of disorder, be-
fore a relaxation phase during which disorder levels gradually
return to a low level. This pattern has been consistently ob-
served for previous cases of rioting, including the aforemen-
tioned instances in multiple US cities3, Paris7 and London9.
In each case, the rapid escalation was seen to coincide with a
triggering event: in the majority of those cases, these took the
form of instances of apparent police brutality.
While this evidence suggests that such triggering events are
a necessary ingredient for riots to occur, however, it is clear
that they are not in themselves sufficient. While the events in
question are undoubtedly serious, other events of a similar na-
ture occur frequently without generating riots. This implies
that the potential for an event to trigger an outbreak is depen-
dent on more general social conditions; that the riot will only
occur if tension is already high. There have been several at-
tempts to explain the mechanics of this process5,21,22. In gen-
eral, it is hypothesized that riots occur in situations in which
some latent grievance - representing a combination of hard-
ship and absence of legitimacy - accumulates in time. Many
factors may contribute to this, including economic factors23,
food scarcity24, racial tensions and the reputation of police.
Berestycki et al.5 characterize these as contributing to a sce-
nario in which the social system is ‘ripe’ for disorder. In Chile,
unfulfilled expectations and a decrease in the legitimacy of
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the governing class appear to have played this role, reaching a
critical mass over a number of years.
More generally, the idea of a transition-like mechanism ap-
plied to decisions and crisis in the context of social sciences
has been circulating over the last 40 years. Granovetter4
for example, applied threshold models of collective behav-
ior to understand rioting behavior, while Koselleck25, from
a more philosophical perspective, extends the concept of cri-
sis into the field of economics. Moreover, as proposed by
Beinhocker26, an economy can be understood as a complex
adaptive system of interacting agents that adapt to each other
and their environments. In contrast to the views of Traditional
Economics, in which the system always converges to an equi-
librium, an economy is an open system that sometimes can be
stable in an equilibrium-like state, or can exhibit very unpre-
dictable behavior patterns that are far from equilibrium pat-
terns, such as exponential growth, radical collapse or oscilla-
tions.
Relatedly, the different phases of social crises that follow a
slow evolution that culminate in a fast transition, or a “catas-
trophe”, resemble the ideas proposed by the Theory of Catas-
trophes, developed by Thom27,28. Catastrophe Theory can de-
scribe the evolution of a process that depends on a set of con-
trol parameters, and whose qualitative behavior can abruptly
change under small variations of these parameters (the point at
which the “catastrophe” happens). Although sometimes this
theory has been applied to areas of knowledge such as biology
or social sciences in a heuristic fashion (see Zeeman28), the
evolution of the state of social tension experienced by a popu-
lation can also be understood in these terms. Socio-economic
factors may increase or decrease this social tension and, even-
tually, an insignificant variation in some of them (e.g. a rise
in the subway fare), may suddenly increase the social tension
in such a way that a “catastrophe” occurs. This is interpreted
as an abrupt change in the social behavior of the people. In-
terestingly, because the transition is abrupt (a first order phase
transition) it is irreversible: that is, reversing slightly the trig-
gering factor of the “catastrophe” does not lead the society
back to the original situation.
Therefore, given that economy can be understood as a com-
plex adaptive system26 and because of the generic features
of catastrophe theory27,28, one may claim that the Chilean
2019 social unrest episode has completely changed the state in
which the country was embedded. In fact, the population has
assured that “Chile woke up”, and all the measures that are
being implemented to control the social crisis are expected to
lead the economy towards a “new normality”, but not back to
the original state. It is yet to be seen how this social crisis will
evolve after the current health emergency, Covid-19, starts to
fade.
C. Empirical behavior of the social unrest
The Undersecretary for Human Rights of the Chilean Min-
istry of Justice and Human Rights releases daily reports with
summarized data on the number of serious events per day at
the country level20. The data source, provided by the Min-
istry of Interior and Public Security, comes from the Chilean
Police. Serious events include looting, fire, destruction of pri-
vate or public property and other events of the same nature20.
Since the report is based on integrated data, it does not include
key information such as the category and magnitude of these
serious events, or the location where they took place. This pre-
vents us from analyzing key dimensions of the phenomenon,
like contagion effects between cities. Nevertheless, the data
is rich and some interesting patterns can be observed from the
aggregated data, as illustrated in Fig. 2, where λ (t) represents
the number of serious events that occur at a given time t. Next
we describe the behavior of these events.
1. The most prominent episode was event (1), which
started in October 18th 2019 in Santiago, reaching 350
serious events by October 21st after it started spreading
to other cities in the country, as discussed in Section
II A.
2. Events (3) and (4) in Fig. 2 illustrate the limitations of
aggregated data, since these peaks may correspond to
spatially separated riot episodes occurring in different
cities.
3. Another key observation is that serious events occurred
rather periodically, on a weekly basis. This is possi-
bly explained by the fact that most violent acts occurred
on Friday afternoons, with these becoming somehow a
symbolic day of the social movement.
4. Although our analysis is based on the available data that
is of an aggregated nature, we hypothesize that Chilean
events could satisfy a scale-independent behavior as ob-
served in Ref. 7 for the case of France, and which may
be influenced by social media use, as has been partic-
ipation in Chilean protests before29. Therefore, based
on this assumption, every major event is expected to
be ensued by a dissipation process that decreases ex-
ponentially in time, with an event mean lifetime of the
order of one up to two days. Prior evidence3 shows
that the mean lifetime of an event was about eight hours
in the Los Angeles 1965 social turmoil; about twenty
hours in Detroit 1967; about twelve hours in Washing-
ton D.C. 1968; and up to 4 days in the case of French
riots in 20057. The exponentially decreasing behavior
we observe for the Chilean case is depicted in Fig. 3,
which plots the same data as in Fig. 2 but using a semi-
logarithmic scale. Under this scale, the linear behav-
ior in time corresponds to an exponential behavior of
the original variable. As far as we can see, the first
six events follow an approximately linear behavior after
each event was triggered. The mean lifetime is inversely
proportional to the corresponding slope.
5. We highlight the asymmetry of the events in time: a
sharp lift-off prior to the peak of disorder, followed by a
slow exponential decay afterwards, displaying a highly
nonlinear behavior.
Anatomy of social unrest 5
6. A peculiarity of the Chilean unrest movement is its tem-
poral extent. In prior studies3,7, rioting is character-
ized by a single huge event that eventually dissipates
completely. Yet, as shown in Fig. 2, the Chilean case
displays a significant number of sizeable events. More
importantly, we can observe that they were distributed
throughout a month and a half; furthermore, several
more small fluctuations subsequently took place dur-
ing the summer period, up to mid-March 2020. The
modelling of these non-predicted events represents an
interesting challenge in the context of epidemiological
models.
III. EPIDEMIC-LIKE MODEL FOR RIOTS
Unlike for an infectious disease- which needs close contact
between people for it to spread- social media may affect how
protests and hence rioting events propagate, since its use can
have a positive effect on participation in political and civic
events30. This has been observed in particular in the case
of some Chilean past massive protest movements29. It has
also been studied that influencing peoples’ opinions remains
feasible within social media31. In particular, Valenzuela et
al.32 study how social media relates to protest participation in
Latin America and show that the use of social media for polit-
ical purposes significantly increases the likelihood of protests,
and reduces participation gaps associated with different social
groups. Therefore, in the presence of social media communi-
cation, a first modelling approach that assumes homogeneous
mixing for the susceptible (potential rioters) and “infected”
(rioters) population may be reasonable, i.e. every individual
has the same probability of interacting with every other indi-
vidual and get “infected” with a rioting activity.
A. Model, definitions and basic properties
Almost a hundred years ago, Kermack and McKendrick33
introduced a mathematical model for epidemics, which gave
the base for the model that is known today as the SIR model
for describing the dynamics of infectious deseases. The model
is governed by three variables: I(t) represents the number of
“infected” individuals at time t, S(t) is the number of indi-
viduals who are susceptible to the disease and could move to
the “infected” class, and R(t) = N−S(t)− I(t) is the number
of removed individuals. The dynamics of the model is solely
determined by I(t) and S(t), since N, the total population, is
constant. The equations for susceptible and infected individu-
als of the SIR model therefore read33 (we adapt in the current
paper the notations proposed by Ref. 7)
d
dt
I(t) = −ωI(t)+S(t)P(s→ i, t)
d
dt
S(t) =−S(t)P(s→ i, t)
where ω is a decaying rate of the infected population and
P(s→ i, t) represents the transmission rate at which a suscep-
tible individual becomes infected. This latter term is assumed
to be proportional to the number of individuals currently in-
fected - that is, P(s→ i, t) = κI(t), with κ a parameter with
units of 1/time × 1/(number of individuals).
By analogy with the above approach, Burbeck et al.3 intro-
duced an epidemic-like model for riots, in which I(t) repre-
sents the total number of active rioters, and S(t) denotes the
number of individuals susceptible to join the disorder. Further,
it is assumed that the number of riot events, λ (t), is propor-
tional to the number of rioters, i.e. (the symbol := indicates a
definition)
λ (t) := αI(t),
where α is assumed to be constant with units of (number of
events)/(number of individuals). Equivalently, the potential
‘supply’ of riot events, σ(t), is defined in terms of the volume
of available individuals:
σ(t) := αS(t).
Then, the model proposes:
dλ
dt
=−ωλ +βσλ , (1)
dσ
dt
=−βσλ . (2)
Here, ω and β = κα , with units of 1/time and 1/time× 1/events
respectively, are parameters of the problem, representing the
exit rate from the riot events class and the transmission rate per
riot event. We emphasize that the parameters α and κ are un-
known in this context. Finally, this set of ordinary differential
equations (o.d.e.) is complemented by the initial conditions:
σ(t0) = σ0 & λ (t0) = λ0. (3)
As a first consequence of the model, one has that the num-
ber of inactive individuals, which are the ones susceptible to
join a riot, decreases strictly in time, therefore the asymp-
totic dynamics is: σ(t)→ σ∞, thus, λ (t)→ 0 as t → ∞ as
well. More importantly, this system is integrable; this prop-
erty solves exactly the problem, and provides a simple frame
of analysis for the contagion model. Dividing (1) by (2) gives
dλ
dσ =
ω
β
1
σ −1, and thus
λ +σ −ν logσ =C. (4)
Here we define the shorthand notation ν = ωβ . The constant C
should be fixed by the initial conditions (3), so that:
λ = λ0+ν log
(
σ
σ0
)
− (σ −σ0). (5)
This integral (5) is sketched in Fig. 4-(a).
In principle the integral (5) solves the problem. Neverthe-
less, to find the time dependent behavior one replaces (5) into
(2), thus
dσ
dt
=−βσ
(
λ0+ν log
(
σ
σ0
)
− (σ −σ0)
)
,
that is
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Φ(σ ;σ0,λ0;ν) =
∫ σ
σ0
dσ
σ
(
λ0+ν log
(
σ
σ0
)
− (σ −σ0)
) =−β (t− t0). (6)
Finally, one computes λ (t) through Eq. (5).
B. Activation of rioting epidemics and their prevention
It is interesting to answer the question about what happens
if we introduce a small number of rioters (λ0/α) into a popu-
lation of susceptibles (σ0/α); will there be an epidemic of riot
events? The dynamics depends crucially on the initial value
σ0; more precisely, they depend on whether σ0 is greater or
smaller than ν = ω/β . Indeed, dσ/dt < 0 for all t (since the
right-hand side of eqn. (2) is negative) and dλ/dt > 0 if and
only if σ > ν (see the right-hand side of eqn. (1)). Therefore,
λ (t) increases as long as σ > ν , but since σ(t) is decreas-
ing, λ (t) eventually will decrease and approach zero. Hence,
if σ0 < ν , then λ (t) decreases strictly to zero exponentially
for all t (the right-hand side of eqn. (1) is always negative),
which means that there is no epidemic of riot events. On the
other hand, if σ0 > ν , then the right-hand side of eqn. (1)
is first positive and hence λ (t) first increases to a maximum,
which is attained when σ = ν , and then the right-hand side
of eqn. (1) becomes negative so that λ (t) decreases strictly to
zero exponentially. These latter dynamics correspond to the
occurrence of an epidemic of riot events. In this case, the ini-
tial number of susceptible individuals (potential rioters) was
sufficient for active rioters to “infect” enough susceptible in-
dividuals to join the riots and produce riot events. That way,
riot events invade the population up to a certain point (maxi-
mum), and then eventually decay. These simple dynamics are
represented in Fig. 4 (b), for σ0 < ν (no epidemic) and σ0 > ν
(epidemic).
Regardless of the initial value of σ , λ decreases to zero as
λ (t)≈ λ∗e−ω(t−t∗) t→ ∞. (7)
Therefore, the long time behavior of λ is to decay exponen-
tially in time, with decaying rate simply given by the param-
eter ω . For this reason, ω may be seen as the inverse of the
mean lifetime of the riot event, and we thus explicitly define
this lifetime, τ , as τ = 1/ω.
The quantity σ0/ν = βσ0× 1ω = βσ0τ is a threshold quan-
tity, which in epidemiological modelling is called the Ba-
sic Reproduction Number and is usually denoted by R0 (See
Refs. 34 and 35). Its value determines the dynamics of the
system; since a riot epidemic occurs when σ0/ν > 1, which
is equivalent to R0 > 1, and no riot epidemic happens when
R0 < 1. The interpretation of R0 = βσ0τ in the context of
riot activity is that it is the average number of secondary riot
events caused by a single riot event introduced into a popula-
tion of susceptible individuals (potential rioters) of size σ0/α
over the duration of that single riot event (τ = 1/ω). This can
be explained step by step in the following way: β is the riot
events transmission rate, which is a parameter that is equal
to the product of the contact rate of an active rioter with sus-
ceptible rioters times the probability per contact that such a
contact produces “infection”, i.e. produces a new active rioter
that generates rioting events. Hence, one riot event produces
βσ0 new riot events per unit of time in a population with σ0/α
susceptible individuals (σ0 potential riot events). Since ω is
the parameter that represents the exit rate from the riot events
class, τ = 1/ω is the mean lifetime of each riot event (see
eqn. (7) and its explanation). Therefore, βσ0τ is the average
number of new riot events in a population with σ0/α suscepti-
ble individuals (σ0 potential riot events) produced by one riot
event during the time it lasts.
In this simple model, the transition from a dynamic that dis-
plays an epidemic of riot events to one that does not, is simply
characterized by the initial value of potential riot events (σ0),
the riot transmission rate (β ) and the duration of a riot event
(τ). In particular, if β and τ are fixed, the bifurcation scheme
of the system is characterized by a change in the initial state
of potential rioters.
Models like the ones presented in this section can give qual-
itative insights on rioting dynamics that could help policy-
makers to make informed decisions. As discussed above, the
threshold quantity R0 = βσ0τ determines riot event dynam-
ics. In order to prevent riot events epidemics in a popula-
tion with a fixed number of σ0/α potential rioters, a public
safety policy would need to implement measures that reduce
τ and/or β such that R0 < 1, in which case a riot events epi-
demic would be prevented.
Fig. 5(a) shows the threshold curve R0 = 1 for σ0 = 489
[e] that corresponds to the first peak in Fig. 2. As pictured,
the curve divides the parameter space (β ,τ) into two regions:
the region above the curve represents parameter sets for which
riot event epidemics occur (R0 > 1) and the region below the
curve represents parameter sets for which no epidemics occur
(R0 < 1).
The major riot events epidemic (the first peak in Fig. 2)
corresponds to a parameter set of a mean lifetime duration
per riot event of τ ≈ 1.33 [d], a transmission rate β = 0.0063
[e−1d−1] per riot event and a population of susceptible riot-
ers that would be responsible for σ0 = 489 [e] potential riot
events (see Table I). This riot events epidemic has a basic re-
production number of R0 = 5.88 (see Table I), which is in-
deed greater than 1 (epidemic) and its parameter set is repre-
sented by the dot in Fig. 5(a). In order to prevent future riot
events epidemics of this form, in a population with σ0 = 489
[e] potential riot events, a public safety policy that sufficiently
reduces the mean lifetime duration of a riot event (τ) would
be able to prevent such an epidemic. Fig. 5(a) shows that re-
ducing τ below 0.326 [d], while fixing β , produces a rioting
situation in the region whereR0 < 1 and hence a riot event is
prevented.
Some strategies to prevent outbreaks of contagious rioting
involve measures that target the transmission rate β . This
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could be achieved by reducing the contact rate between ac-
tive rioters and the susceptible population, or by lowering the
probability that an active rioter, upon contact with a suscepti-
ble individual, “infects” him or her, creating more rioters and
hence more riot events. The effectiveness with which ideas
can be spread via social media and the intrinsic characteristics
of how a population communicates (physical or virtual) may
be key to predict the behavior of an upcoming riot activity.
If the number of potential riot events existing initially in a
population (σ0) changes, the public safety policy that reduces
the duration of a riot event or targets the contact rate between
individuals could change. Fig. 5(b) shows that in a population
where now σ0 = 83 [e], the threshold curve changes and hence
the threshold values for the parameters, which are needed to
pass from the regionR0 > 1 to the regionR0 < 1, change.
C. Hamiltonian dynamics
The existence of the conservation quantity (4) indicates that
the dynamics follows a tangential flow from the conserved
quantity. In other words, the system may be written in terms
of a Hamiltonian dynamics. Let be,
H = β (λ +σ)−ω logσ ,
then equations (1) and (2) may be written as:
1
λ
dλ
dt
= σ
∂H
∂σ
, (8)
1
σ
dσ
dt
=−λ ∂H
∂λ
. (9)
Thus, taking the canonical variables (x,y) as:
x = logλ , (10)
y = logσ , (11)
and a Hamiltonian
H = β (ex+ ey)−ωy, (12)
then, one writes the Burbeck, et al. epidemic model with a
Hamiltonian structure:
dx
dt
=
∂H
∂y
=−ω+βey, (13)
dy
dt
=−∂H
∂x
=−βex. (14)
Moreover, as already shown after (5), the model is integrable.
This fact will be pertinent in the following applications.
D. Parametric periodic and stochastic forced variations of
Burbeck, et al. epidemic model.
By construction, the model equations (1) and (2) cannot
predict more than one riot event. Indeed, because the num-
ber of potential rioters, σ , decreases strictly in time (see eqn.
(2)), the graphical scheme presented in Fig. 4 shows that the
dynamics does not present a returning point. Therefore, there
is no way to revert the trajectory in the (λ ,σ) phase portrait.
We conclude that, to reach a dynamical behavior with various
events, one needs to modify the original model by including
other basic phenomena. Essentially, the number of potential
rioters must increase in some way, which can be done using
different source terms. The simplest way is to introduce a
linear growth rate of the individuals that eventually may join
a riot, σ ; more precisely, a γσ term on the right-hand side of
(2). This model is equivalent to the well known Lotka-Volterra
population dynamics model. Another possibility is a time de-
pendent forcing. We summarize these different possibilities in
the following short hand notation:
dσ
dt
=−βσλ +σ(t)
 γf (t)√η ξ (t) . (15)
Here f (t) denotes a periodic forcing, that we will define pre-
cisely later on, and ξ (t) is a stochastic variable which we con-
sider as a δ -correlated white noise. More formally, the first
two moments are 〈ξ (t)〉= 0, and 〈ξ (t)ξ (t ′)〉= δ (t−t ′). Here
the function δ (t) denotes a Dirac δ -function which simulates
extremely short-time correlation. More specifically, δ (t) is
zero at every time except at t = 0, and its integral satisfies∫ t
−∞
δ (s)ds =
{
0 t < 0
1 t > 0 .
Therefore, equations (1) and (15) may be written in the fol-
lowing form after a suitable change of variables (10) and (11)
to a set of Hamilton equations plus an additive forcing:
dx
dt
=
∂H
∂y
, (16)
dy
dt
=−∂H
∂x
+
 γf (t)√η ξ (t) , (17)
where H is given by (12).
1. The case of constant forcing.
In this case the epidemic model becomes a special Lotka-
Volterra system that displays a pure oscillatory behavior. The
dynamics are periodic and quite trivial; more importantly, they
are un-realistic in the current context and so we will not dis-
cuss this case further.
2. The case of periodic forcing.
As stressed, the social movement possesses a natural
weekly period. A natural way to model that is by taking the
periodic excitation:
f (t) = f0
∞
∑
l=1
δ (t− lT ). (18)
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Here f0 is the forcing intensity, T is the period, and the δ -
function emulates a time localized excitation of the variable
σ ; a kind of periodic kick. The equations of motion for this
kick-epidemic model read
dx
dt
=−ω+βey, (19)
dy
dt
=−βex+ f0
∞
∑
l=1
δ (t− lT ). (20)
The whole solution (x(t),y(t)) for all t is obtained by im-
posing at each t = ld the continuity of the function x(t) and a
jump condition on y(t)which is obtained directly after an inte-
gration of Eq. (20) in a small interval, t ∈ (lT−, lT+), around
t = lT . The jump conditions read
x(lT+) = x(lT−)
y(lT+) = y(lT−)+ f0, (21)
where y(lT+) is the value of y(t) just after t = lT and y(lT−)
is the value of y(t) just before t = lT . In the original vari-
ables, if f0 is positive, then the kick will increase the number
of potential rioters, thus making it possible to re-start a riot if
σ(lT+) = e f0σ(lT−) > ν . On the other hand, the number of
events, i.e. the λ variable, is a continuous function at the kick.
From a mathematical perspective, when f0 6= 0 the system
is perturbed by periodic kicks which breaks the integrability
of the system. The value of H, defined in Eq. (12), changes at
each kick but takes a constant value Hl over each interval t ∈
(lT,(l + 1)T ) where the system is integrable. The equations
(19) and (20) can be solved in each of these intervals, with the
formal solution being given by (5) and (6).
Using this formal solution in the (x,y) variables, together
with the jump condition (21), we can construct a stroboscopic
or Poincaré mapM :
(x((l+1)T+),y((l+1)T+)) =M
(
x(lT+),y(lT+)
)
, (22)
that provides a mapping from one kick to the next one.
The nonlinear map, M , can in principle be expressed ex-
plicitly; however, this is not required for our purposes. Due
to the Hamiltonian nature of the evolution, this map has the
symplectic property. Maps with this property have been stud-
ied vastly in the past. As we know from the properties of the
map (22), the solutions are either periodic, quasi-periodic or
chaotic36.
A periodic behavior appears as a fixed point in the
(λ (lT ),σ(lT )) phase portrait of the nonlinear mapping (See
Fig. 6(a)-(b)). As shown in Fig. 6(a), it appears that this fixed
point is elliptic so that the orbits around it represent a quasi-
periodic behavior, as may be seen in Fig. 6(c). Finally, around
the border of the orbits there are chaotic trajectories as can be
seen in Fig. 6(d).
3. The case of a stochastic forcing.
In the case of a stochastic forcing, the trajectories are er-
ratic and quite different for various realizations. This can be
seen in Fig. 7, where seven different stochastic realizations of
equations (1) and (15) (with the stochastic forcing ξ (t)) are
plotted together.
As is well known, only a probabilistic description makes
sense in this kind of differential equations. In the case of eqns.
(16) and (17) (with the stochastic forcing ξ (t)), the stationary
probability is the so-called Gibbs measure:
pst ∼ e−
1
η H = e−
1
η (β (e
x+ey)−ωy).
The maximum of this probability corresponds to the min-
ima of the Hamiltonian (12). This Hamiltonian, H, has no
minima in the x-direction, thus the most probable situation is
as x→−∞, that is λ → 0. On the other hand, H has a mini-
mum along the y direction, which is for ey = ν , that is σ = ν .
Therefore, we conclude that in the stochastic model the so-
cial system presents a small probability of damaging events,
while the latent population to engage in disorder and join ri-
ots is in average critical σ = σc = ν . Because of this fact,
the model presents similarities with the mechanism of self-
organized criticality38, which is common in many “cathas-
trophic” systems, such as avalanches and earthquakes39, and
is also present in epidemic diseases40.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
To fit the data with the solution of the system of o.d.e.’s
(1) and (2), one needs to fit the parameters ω,β together with
an initial condition, {t0,λ0,σ0}; that is, we need to find the
best fit varying five parameters. As a first guess, we can esti-
mate some of these parameters from the data and the analytic
results of Section III. First, the asymptotic expression (7) al-
lows us to estimate ω from a simple linear regression that fits
the observations in Fig. 3.
Next, imposing directly from the data that at t = t0 the
number of events is λ0, then the remaining two parameters
β and σ0 follow after imposing that at t = tmax the number
of events reaches its maximum value of λmax = λ (tmax), for
which σ = ν (see previous Section III B). Thus after (6) one
gets:
∫ ξ0
1
dξ
ξ (λ0/ν+ log(ξ/ξ0)− (ξ −ξ0)) = ω(tmax− t0).(23)
Here we have used the change of variables ξ = σ/ν and we
denote ξ0 = σ0/ν ≡ R0 for the reproduction number. Eq.
(23) provides a first relation among ξ0 and ν for a given set
of parameters (t0, tmax,λ0,λmax). The second relation comes
from (4), namely:
1
ν
(λmax−λ0) = ξ0− logξ0−1. (24)
Computing ν from (24) and introducing it into equation (23),
one gets relation for ξ0:
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∫ ξ0
1
dξ
ξ
(
λ0
λmax−λ0 (ξ0− logξ0−1)+ log(ξ/ξ0)− (ξ −ξ0)
) = ω(tmax− t0), (25)
as an implicit function of all other parameters,
(t0, tmax,λ0,λmax). To solve the equation (25) for ξ0, we
may use a straight-forward graphic procedure: for given
values of λ0 and λmax one plots the left-hand side of (25)
as a function of ξ0, then the intersection of this curve with
the constant given value ω(tmax − t0) provides directly ξ0.
Finally, one completes the original system (23,24), computing
ν from (24). Fig. 8 illustrates the procedure for the first peak
of Fig. 2.
Repeating the same procedure for each event, one can ob-
tain suitable parameters to characterize them. The parameters,
(t(i)0 ,λ
(i)
0 ,ξ
(i)
0 ,ω
(i),ν(i)), obtained by this method are not nec-
essarily the best set of parameters to fit the data by the solution
of the set of ordinary differential equations (1) and (2) over the
time interval of the event duration. To quantify the precision
of the realized model we compute the mean squared error:
error =
1
K
K−1
∑
n=0
(
λ (tn)
λn
−1
)2
,
where λ (t) is the numerical solution of the o.d.e. system (1)
and (2) using the obtained parameters, thus, λ (tn) is this so-
lution evaluated at tn. On the other hand, λn is the value from
the data at day tn.
To improve the initial estimations, we use the previous cal-
culation, (t(i)0 ,λ
(i)
0 ,ξ
(i)
0 ,ω
(i),ν(i)), as a starting guess, then
we explore randomly 104 trials around this seed point for a
smaller error; that is, better set of parameters. More pre-
cisely, the initial guess point belongs to a space in five di-
mensions and the exploration is bounded to a vicinity of lin-
ear size ∆. A typical neighborhood is defined for instance by:
λ0 ∈ [λ (i)0 (1−∆/2),λ (i)0 (1+∆/2)] and the same for other pa-
rameters. Finally, this random search is iterated and the vicin-
ity size is reduced by half (∆→ ∆/2) at each step. For all
cases after 5 iterations, the procedure converges to a better set
of parameters, improving the original estimation by a factor of
between 10 and 100 (see Table I). The final set of parameters
will be denoted by: (t∗0 ,λ
∗
0 ,ξ
∗
0 ,ω
∗,ν∗).
Table I summarizes the initial guesses from the conditions
(24) and (25) and the final values after convergence. Lastly,
the mean squared error criteria of convergence is also shown.
As an example, we provide in Fig. 9 the best fitting found
for the case of the first and largest event shown in Fig. 2.
From the data summarized in Table I, some interesting
features can be observed: Among all figures, the values of
ξ0 ≡ σ0/ν are more or less uniform for all cases. On average
one notices that 〈σ0/ν〉 ≈ 5.25, indicating that all events have
almost the same reproduction number with value greater than
one, and hence the epidemics take off with almost the same
strength. Similarly, although the value of the maximum num-
ber of events is quite disparate, the ratio λmax/ν also varies
among a well-defined value around 〈λmax/ν〉 ≈ 3.34. This
is not surprising, in light of the relation (24) that provides
λmax/ν as a single function of σ0/ν if λ0  λmax. Because
ξ0 = σ0/ν is not close to unity, it is expected that the event
peaks manifest characteristic asymmetry respect to the peak
maxima, as already noticed in Section II C. Indeed, the taking-
off phase of an event is sharper than the exponential decaying
stage after the event. Symmetric peaks are a result valid if
σ0 & ν , in which case it is legitimate to approximate the de-
nominator in equation (6) by a quadratic form.
Another remarkable feature of the anatomy of the Chilean
episodes is that the time scale ω does not vary substantially
across all observed events. On average, 〈ω〉 ≈ 0.76 [1/d];
that is, the mean lifetime is of the order of one day and eight
hours. More precisely, after two days, the activity decreases
by a factor of 5 from its peak, and after three days, the event
magnitude decreases by a factor of 10. Although the US
disturbances3 and the French riots7 share many similarities
with the Chilean unrest phenomena - in particular with respect
to the temporal scales (1.ω . 3 [1/d] for the USA, ω ≈ 0.25
[1/d] for France, and ω ≈ 0.75 [1/d] for Chile) - we empha-
size that the Chilean case is the only one that shows sizeable
rebounds and sequels, which, to our knowledge, is unique and
makes this historic episode all the more remarkable. The se-
quels present a regular periodicity of event occurrence times
across the first six events, with the interval sequence between
consecutive tmax being {8,9,6,9,4} days. This suggests that
the Chilean riots might be interpreted in terms of periodic ex-
ternal forcing, as discussed in Section III D.
V. DISCUSSION
Motivated by the 2019 Chilean social unrest that caused
costly infrastructure damage and serious injuries to a group of
the population, we take advantage of mathematical modelling
and numerical simulations to analyze this complex social phe-
nomenon and compare findings with public aggregated data,
thereby increasing our understanding of how this type of so-
cial event evolves through time.
We analyze the dynamics of the Chilean rioting episodes
that started in October 2019 from the perspective of epidemic-
like models. We show that this approach can be interpreted in
a relatively easy way and could be used to understand the fac-
tors that determine the dynamics of rioting events, and qualita-
tively guide policymakers to make informed decisions aimed
at ensuring public safety. In addition, the approach offers a
richer explanatory power due to the existence of an underly-
ing Hamiltonian structure. In fact, under the influence of a
periodic forcing, the dynamics may display three types of be-
havior depending on the parameters: 1) periodic oscillation;
2) quasi-periodic oscillation; or 3) chaotic dynamics. On the
other hand, in the presence of a stochastic forcing, the most
probable behavior places the system in a critical condition for
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contagion. Interestingly, this result tells us that social turmoil
events may be in the same class as the well-known phenomena
of self-organized criticality; something that we plan to study
in the future.
Although all these properties are exciting and promising,
it seems clear that the observed Chilean social phenomenon
requires a more careful and interdisciplinary effort. In par-
ticular, several questions remain open: From a psychological
perspective, what triggered the rage to flourish in a substantial
percentage of the population, provoking massive sentiments
of unfairness that found sympathy even in the well-off social
class? How could we include these psychological factors in
an epidemic-like model? How did the riot events spread spa-
tially, stimulating episodes of disorder throughout the coun-
try? From a social network perspective, can we understand
the speed at which ideas and opinions (fake and true) become
popular in social media, influencing group thinking and, there-
fore, group behavior? What enables the spread of fake news,
and how damaging are they in terms of group contagion that
can lead to catastrophic outcomes? How can we avoid the
spread of these fake news within a social network? These last
three questions can readily be framed within our modelling
approach, since they relate to the structure and rate of conta-
gion.
It should be emphasized that modelling efforts such as those
presented here are strictly complementary to other avenues via
which social disorder can be prevented. As outlined in the pa-
per, riots have complex sociological causes - often grounded
in hardship - and any strategy or policy must necessarily in-
clude aspects which address these and reduce the motivation
to engage in disorder. Nevertheless, such factors are typically
chronic and can only be addressed in the long term; further-
more, it would be naïve to expect that the motivation to riot
could ever be eradicated. Given this, the planning and test-
ing of practical responses is a necessary component of any
strategy, in order to minimize the negative consequences of
disorder when it does occur. If mathematical modelling and
numerical simulations are able to describe and predict the dy-
namics of violent social turmoils, they become a powerful tool
to provide authorities involved in politics and security with
useful insights to understand this complex social phenomena.
This information can be used as an input to make informed
decisions and attempt to prevent contagion effects of rioting.
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VI. APPENDIXES
Appendix A: Timeline summary
This Appendix summarizes the main events of the social
unrest discussed in Section II A and Fig. 1.
• Monday October 7th, 2019: Under the slogan
“Evade!” secondary students self-organized via social
networks to massively evade the subway fare in the cap-
ital city of Santiago as a consequence of a 3.75 percent
fare hike of CLP$30. Although this increase represents
less than 5 cents of a US dollar, low-income families
spend between 13 and 28 percent of their budget on
public transportation.
• Monday October 14th, 2019: Student protests continue
in Santiago and several stations on Line 5 were closed
in the afternoon after violent incidents were reported.
• Friday October 18th, 2019 (The zero day): The esca-
lation of protests. Within two weeks the social unrest
turned massive and violent; destruction of the subway
stations in Santiago was coordinated, damaging almost
60 percent of them. The entire Metro system was closed
after the attacks, and it remained closed for several days
and weeks. The police force tried dispersing the crowds
firing rubber bullets, teargas and water cannons.
• Saturday October 19th, 2019: The violence continues.
Shops were looted, buses were set alight and clashes
occurred between the security forces and rioters. The
President imposed a curfew in Santiago from 22:00 to
07:00 hours and the army was taken to the streets. Af-
ter rioters started spreading to other cities, the President
declared a state of emergency in Valaparaíso and Con-
cepción. The increase in the metro fare was cancelled.
• Sunday October 20th, 2019: As violent protests contin-
ued, the President publicly announced on the evening
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that “We are at war against a powerful enemy...”.41 The
next day, the head of national defense, Javier Iturriaga,
assured in a press conference that “I am not at war
with anyone...". As violent protests continued spread-
ing, curfews were imposed in the Santiago Metropoli-
tan Region, and the regions of Valparaíso, Bíobío, and
Coquimbo.
• Friday October 25th, 2019: In spite of the palliative
measures promoted by the Chilean Government, the
citizens went back to the streets. Over a million peo-
ple took to the streets in Santiago, and thousands more
throughout Chile, becoming the largest pacific demon-
stration after Chile returned to democracy.
• Wednesday October 30th, 2019: Amid the ongo-
ing clashes between protesters and security forces, the
Chilean Government decides to pull out of hosting the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and The
UN Climate Change Conference (COP 25).
• Sunday November 10th, 2019: Towards a new Consti-
tution. The Government agreed to initiate a process to
draft a new Constitution.
• Monday November 12th, 2019: Change of cabinet. As
a result of the massive protests, the President reshuffled
his cabinet. He replaced the interior and finance minis-
ters, and the government spokesperson.
• Friday November 15th, 2019: Lawmakers agreed and
signed an “Agreement for Peace and a New Constitu-
tion”, an agreement that was regarded as “historic”. In a
referendum, initially scheduled for April 26th 2020 but
postponed to October 2020 due to the Covid-19 pan-
demia, voters will be asked whether they approve the
idea of a new constitution and whether current lawmak-
ers should serve on the commission that would redraft
the document.
• Tuesday November 19th, 2019: The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, an agency under the Organiza-
tion of American States, condemned the excessive use
of force during social protests and called on the author-
ities to order state security forces to immediately cease
their disproportionate use of force. Amid public outcry
over eye injuries suffered by hundreds of protesters, the
police decides to cease the use of rubber bullets against
rioters.
• Friday November 22nd , 2019: Rejection of the
Amnesty International report. Both the Government
and the Chilean Army openly rejected the report pre-
pared by Amnesty International, a non-governmental
organization that investigates violations of human rights
occurred in different countries. The organization
recorded at least 23 cases of human rights violations,
documented in eight different regions since the start of
the social unrest.
• Saturday November 23rd , 2019: The social turmoil
leaves 23 dead. After the President recognized that
there may have been a breach of protocols for the use of
force by the police in Chile, the official death toll was
announced during the social outbreak, which reached
23.
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FIG. 2. The plot of serious events per day are presented as a function of time. t = 0 is set on October 18th 2019, the day that the violent
social unrest started in Santiago downtown. During the first 50 days, we notice the existence of about 6 extreme events. The colored curves
represent the theoretical fits using the epidemic model (see Sections III and IV). The fits are labeled as follows: The fit of the extreme event (1)
corresponds to the red curve; (2) corresponds to orange; (3) corresponds to green; (4) corresponds to cyan; (5) corresponds to blue; and, (6)
corresponds to purple. After a quiet period during Christmas 2019, few smaller events can be observed. Events (7) and (8), presented to the
right of the figure, correspond to pink and yellow, respectively. We zoom in by 10 times the scale of events (7) and (8).
The fitting parameters will be discussed in Section IV and listed in the Table I.
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FIG. 3. The semi-log plot shows the exponential decay after reach-
ing peak activity. The lines correspond to the fit: logλ (t) =−ωt+b,
showing the desired exponential decay of the model. The slopes are
summarized in Table I in the column ω(i).
TABLE I. Fitting parameters for eight events from October 18th, 2019 up to March 5th, 2020.
peak t(i)0 [d] t
(i)
max λ
(i)
0 [e] λ
(i)
max ξ
(i)
0 ω
(i) [1/d ] ν(i) [e] error t∗0 [d] t
∗
max λ ∗0 [e] λ
∗
max ξ ∗0 ω
∗ [1/d ] ν∗ [e] error
1 2 3 100 350 6.484 0.507 69.15 0.0353 1.927 3.145 87.37 345.24 5.882 0.521 83.169 0.0263
2 10 11 21 89 4.666 0.804 31.99 0.222 9.926 10.866 17.922 71.404 4.501 0.847 27.591 0.0515
3 19 20 26 84 5.486 0.572 20.83 0.499 18.822 19.811 21.606 67.59 5.256 0.596 17.732 0.054
4 25 26 50 189 5.527 0.627 49.33 2.107 24.866 25.724 43.811 135.77 4.775 0.717 41.558 0.134
5 34 35 16 86 4.932 0.849 29.96 0.534 33.961 34.87 15.105 74.83 4.834 0.997 26.371 0.0298
6 38 40 7 99 4.345 0.684 49.05 0.988 37.958 39.575 6.189 85.03 4.377 0.814 40.79 0.039
7 103 104 2 30 8.03 0.715 5.660 0.0447 102.99 104.003 1.741 30.06 7.905 0.768 5.884 0.0212
8 136 137 7 28 5.027 0.717 8.705 0.700 135.94 136.8 6.493 21.97 4.640 0.843 7.334 0.045
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FIG. 4. (a) Plot of the conserved quantity (5). The maximum of
(5) is for σ/ν = 1, and the flow of the dynamics is from right to left
as indicated by the arrows. The flow shows that as t → ∞, λ (t)→ 0
and σ(t)→ σ∞. IfR0 = σ0/ν > 1, then, the trajectory in the (λ ,σ)
plane goes from the starting point to the left reaching λ = 0. While, if
R0 = σ0/ν < 1 the trajectories end directly at λ = 0 without passing
by the maximum of the curve. (b) Temporal evolution of the number
of riot events for two different initial conditions, corresponding to
the red and blue points of (a) and fixed ν value.
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FIG. 5. (a) Plot of the threshold curveR0 = βσ0τ = 1 in the (β ,τ)
plane for riot event epidemics. The red curve represents the threshold
curve for σ0 = 489 [e] that divides the two regions where R0 > 1
andR0 < 1. The dot represents the case of the major epidemic event
(1) of Fig. 2, where the fitting parameters are ω = 0.521 [1/d], β =
0.0063 [e−1d−1], and σ0 = 489 [e] from Table I which produceR0 =
5.882 > 1. (b) In addition of (a) it is show blue curve for different
σ0 = 83.2 [e] which produceR0 = 1.
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FIG. 6. (a) Poincare map for the couple (λ (lT+),σ(lT+)), for the
parameters: ω = β , T = 1 and f0 = 1 and for different values of the
initial conditions: (λ (0),σ(0)). It is seen that the system displays
a periodic orbit, which corresponds to a fixed point in the map (See
(b)). Around the fixed point one notices the existence of closed or-
bits that represent a quasi-periodic behavior. Finally, because of the
external orbits break-up into a domain of chaotic behavior. The next
plots show the temporal behavior of the variables λ (t) and σ(t) for
various initial conditions such that the dynamics displays: (b) a peri-
odic behavior for (λ (0),σ(0))≈ (0.9194125,1.58198); (c) a quasi-
periodic behavior (λ (0),σ(0)) ≈ (1,1); and (d) a chaotic behavior
(λ (0),σ(0))≈ (0.075,1).
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FIG. 7. Numerical simulation of the system (1) and (15) where ξ (t)
is a white noise. (a) Plot of the temporal evolution of the riot activity,
λ (t). (b) Plot of the potential number of rioters, σ(t) for the same
realizations as in (a). The parameters are ω = β = 1 and η = 1.
The initial contidion is the same for all realizations: (λ (0),σ(0)) ≈
(1,2). For the numerics we use the Euler-Mayurama scheme37.
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FIG. 8. Plot of both, (i) the l.h.s and (ii) the r.h.s of (25) as a
function of ξ0 for λ0 = 100[e], λmax = 350[e], t0 = 2[d], tmax = 3[d],
and ω(i) = 0.5065[1/d]. The value of ω(tmax− t0) = 0.5065, and the
intersection provides the solution for ξ (i)0 = 6.4847. Finally, from
(24 ) one computes ν = 69.15[e].
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FIG. 9. Plot of the normalized riot activity λ (t)/ν and the potential
rioters σ(t)/ν as a function of time. The data is also normalized by
ν . For the simulation, the parameters are t0 = 1.927, λ0 = 87.37,
σ0 = 489.2, ω = 0.521, β = 0.00626, and ν = 83.169.
